1.
It is now well documented that the Ottoman Empire committed massacres against the Armenian population during and shortly after World War I (the "War"). There is abundant literature discussing whether or not these acts can in fact be considered as acts of "genocide" under international law. 1 While some historians have contested the qualification of these events as genocide, 2 the vast majority of writers believe that genocide has indeed taken place. 3 At any rate, these acts were certainly illegal at the time they were committed. 4 These actions must (at the very least) be considered as "internationally wrongful acts" under international law. According to Article 1 of the International Law Commission (I.L.C.)'s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the commission of an internationally wrongful act by a State entails its international responsibility 5 The responsible State must make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 2. While there is no doubt that the Ottoman Empire committed internationally wrongful acts against the Armenian population during World War I, a problem arises from the fact that the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist as a State in 1923. Who should then be responsible for these wrongful acts? Can it be the "Republic of Turkey," which was only officially proclaimed on 29 October 1923 (i.e. only after the wrongful acts were committed)? That is precisely the question that the present paper examines : can the modern State of Turkey be held responsible under international law for internationally wrongful acts (including acts of genocide) which were committed by the Ottoman Empire before its disintegration? 3. This paper is divided into two chapters. The first chapter briefly examines whether Turkey should be considered under international law as the "continuing" State (or "continuator" State) of the Ottoman Empire or whether it should, instead, be categorized as a "new" State. Our position is that Turkey is, in legal terms, "identical" to the Ottoman Empire and is therefore "continuing" the international legal personality of the Empire. Since Turkey is not considered as a new State, 4. Suffice it to note that during the War, the Allies (United Kingdom, France and Russia) denounced in a joint declaration (dated 24 May 1915) that the Ottoman Government's massacre of Armenian populations constituted "crimes against humanity and civilization for which all the members of the Turkish Government would be held responsible together with its agents implicated in the massacres. to the territorial transformation. 11 When the two entities, examined at two different moments, are considered as being "identical," this means that there is a "continuing" international legal personality. 12 This is, of course, a legal fiction insofar as the State that exists now is not necessarily perfectly "identical" to the one that existed back then. 13 In fact, the relevant question to be asked is whether two entities have the same international legal personality despite substantial changes to its territory, name, and government.
14 There is a presumption in favour of continuity under international law. According to this presumption, a State will continue to exist unless sufficient evidence demonstrates its extinction. 15 6. There are no "formal" criteria under international law that help to categorically distinguish cases of continuity from those of discontinuity. 16 Some criteria have nevertheless been identified in doctrine to determine concretely whether there is State identity. The first such criterion is territory. A State does not necessarily lose its international legal personality as a result of a change to its territory. 17 By some accounts, between 1878 and 1918 the Ottoman Empire lost some 85% of its territory 18 But even such a substantial diminution of territory does not in itself affect the legal personality of a State.
19 This is the conclusion reached in 1925 by sole arbitrator Borel in the Ottoman Public Debt case which recognised that "in international law, the Turkish Republic was deemed to continue the international personality of the former Turkish Empire" despite important territorial losses. 20 
7.
Similarly, a change of government does not, in itself, amount to the creation of a new State. 21 The identity of a State is not affected by a change of government even when it arises as a result of a revolution or a coup d'État. 22 It is not disputed that Turkey went through fundamental changes in the 1920s. The changes were not limited to the replacement of the Monarchy by a Republic-far-reaching changes also affected the society more globally. Despite these changes, it cannot be concluded that Turkey is a new State under international law. 23 8. It is also clear that changes in population do not affect the identity of a State. 24 By some accounts, the Ottoman Empire lost some 75% of its population between 1878 and 1918. 25 While this is no doubt a significant loss of population, it is not in itself proof of discontinuity. Similarly, it simply cannot be automatically deduced from the fact that in 1923 the country's name was changed from the "Ottoman Empire" to the "Republic of Turkey," that the latter is a new State.
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In fact, the two terms had long been used interchangeably in treaties in the 19th century. 9. There is one important criterion that has been used by some writers to decide issues of identity in the context of considerable losses of territory. Indeed, writers have looked at whether what is left of a State's territory following a significant reduction in its size is the "essential portion" (the core or the nucleus) of the State that existed before its disintegration. 28 For others, there is also identity of State when the dismembered State is still populated by its "core" ethnic/ national group, which was the largest, the most dominant and the most powerful in the "old" State. 10. It can be argued that after centuries of territorial expansion of the Empire, which was then followed by slow disintegration, modern Turkey was reduced in 1923 to its nucleus, its "essential" part, i.e. the "historical homeland" of the Turkish nation. 30 Thus, the dominant ethnic group in the Ottoman Government was the Turks and the official language of the Empire was indeed Turkish. 31 The territories that the Empire gradually lost in the 20th century were essentially non-Turkish (they were populated mainly by Arabs, Jews, and Kurds). The Lighthouse Arbitration case (further discussed below) decided in 1956 by the FrenchGreek Arbitral Tribunal also explicitly recognised that Turkey was the continuing State of the Ottoman Empire. 41 The overwhelming majority of scholars also believe that despite Turkey's considerable losses of territory and population, as well as radical changes to its government (and its society), it continues the international personality of the Ottoman Empire. Amsterdam, 1925 Amsterdam, , in (1925 26 Annual Digest 35 : "Although Turkey was no longer an Empire but a Republic and its size had been considerably curtailed after the Great War by loss of territory, yet it could not be considered that the Republic was not the successor of the Empire. The remaining part, which was the main portion of the country, was the continuation of the State which, under another form of government and larger in size, had formed Turkey, and it had retained all its rights and duties except such as were attached to the lost territories."
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II. RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
41. enquire what happens to international wrongful acts committed before any territorial changes. First, we examine case law and State practice in the context of cession of territories (section B). This is relevant because as mentioned above, after the War, several territories that used to belong to the Ottoman Empire were ceded to members of the Allies : French mandate for Syria and Lebanon, and British mandate over Palestine (and Transjordan) and Mesopotamia (Iraq). Second, we will examine case law and State practice in the context of secession (section C). Again, this is pertinent since several new States in the Arabian Peninsula (Hejaz, Idrisi Emirate of Asir, and Yemen) were created after the War in territories that previously belonged to the Empire. Finally, we will apply these findings of case law and State practice to the case of Turkey (section D).
A. CONTINUITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
15. The logical consequence of an identity of State is the continuity of rights and obligations between the two entities. This principle is well explained by Kelsen :
Whether a State retains its identity in spite of certain changes in the content and sphere of validity of the national legal order, is of importance in international law in the first place with respect to the question whether the international obligations, responsibilities, and rights of a State remain the same, in spite of these changes. If the State remains the same, no change in its obligations, responsibilities, and rights takes place. 43 16. This is also the position of Marek, who defines the legal identity of a State as "the identity of the sum total of its rights and obligations under both customary and conventional international law." 44 Authors have rightly contested Marek's suggestion that these are in fact the "same" rights 43 46 A better view is that "the continued existence of all legal relationships is a consequence of a State's identity, not vice versa". 41 In other words, it is because there is an identity of State that rights and obligations are unchanged, and not the other way around. 17. What is clear is the undeniable fact that if one concludes that entity A (at one point in time) is, in legal terms, identical to entity B (at another point in time), it must logically follow that the rights and obligations which were those of entity A will remain those of entity B. Thus, because entities A and B have the same international personality, it follows that there is a continuity of rights and obligations. 48 18. The next two sections examine whether the same principle applies to obligations arising from international wrongful acts that were committed before any territorial changes took place. In other words, does the continuing State also remain responsible for such wrongful acts? 48. B. STERN, supra, note 13, 41 ("S'il y a continuation -et donc fiction d'identité -les conséquences juridiques non controversées sont le maintien des droits et obligations de l'État 'initial'") (emphasis in the original).
49. The term "cession" is confined to cases where the territorial change is made pursuant to a treaty to which the predecessor State is a party, while the expression "transfer" applies only to situations where there is no agreement between the predecessor State and the successor State.
somewhat different compared to other mechanisms of State succession, insofar as it results neither in the extinction of a State nor in the creation of a new State. 50 In the context of cession of territory, case law and State practice show that the State which continues to exist (the continuing State) after the cession of part of its territory to another State (the successor State), will continue to be held responsible for its own internationally wrongful acts committed before the date of succession (i.e. the date when the cession of territory took place). 51 This principle is also supported in doctrine. 52 We will now examine case law of municipal courts and mixed arbitral tribunals (section a) and focus specifically on one important case involving Turkey : the Lighthouse Arbitration case (section b).
a) Municipal Courts and Mixed Arbitral Tribunals
20.
Several municipal courts of the successor State to which the ceded territory was now attached applied the principle of continuity of responsibility.
53 This is, for instance, the position adopted by Romanian courts in the context of the transfer of the territory of Bessarabia from Soviet Russia to 50. There is one main difference between cases of "cession" of territory and cases of "incorporation." Cases of cession of territory only deal with part of a territory of a State which passes to another State, while cases of incorporation involve the whole territory of the State which is integrated into another State. Another difference is that in cases of cession of territory, the predecessor State is not extinguished as a result of the loss of part of its territory.
51. Case law and State practice is examined in detail in P. Romania in April 1918. These courts all concluded that this transfer did not result in a succession by Romania to the obligations of Soviet Russia regarding the territory of Bessarabia. Thus, it was held that the continuing State (in the present case, Russia) should remain responsible for the internationally wrongful acts it committed in the territory of Bessarabia before the transfer of territory. The same solution was also adopted by French courts in the context of the cession of the territory of Alsace-Lorraine from Germany to France in 1919, 55 wherein Germany remained responsible for any wrongful acts which took place before the cession of territory. The principle was also adopted by one municipal court of a continuing State (from which the ceded territory was detached). This is the case of Hungarian courts in the context of the cession of Transylvania from Hungary to Romania in 1920. 56 21. The application of the principle that the continuing State should remain, in theory, responsible for its own internationally wrongful acts committed before the date of succession has not been limited only to decisions of municipal courts. It was also affirmed by the French-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in the context of the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France after the War. 57 12-a) ; the other for acts for which the Cretan autonomous authorities were allegedly partially responsible along with the Ottoman Empire (Claim No. 11). 23. In Claim No. 12-a, France was seeking damages against Greece (as successor State) for acts committed by the authorities of the Ottoman Empire on the Island of Crete. The alleged internationally wrongful act was the unauthorised removal by the Ottoman Empire of a buoy belonging to the French company. The Arbitral Tribunal ruled that the Ottoman authorities had not committed any internationally wrongful act and that the acts were legitimate for reasons of security. 24 . In an obiter dictum, the Arbitral Tribunal nevertheless indicated that even if the Ottoman Empire had committed an internationally wrongful act, Greece could not be held liable for it. It is Turkey, the continuing State of the Ottoman Empire, which would be liable for its "own" acts committed before the loss of a substantial portion of its territory. For the Arbitral Tribunal, the "critical date" to determine which State should be responsible for which internationally wrongful acts was the date at which the Peace Treaty established that the territory lost by the Ottoman Empire would be transferred to the different successor States. 62 The Arbitral Tribunal added that this solution was not only dictated by the terms of the Lausanne Peace Treaty but also that it was in conformity with rules of State succession :
One can only admit that within the scope of this conventional sharing of responsibilities according to time, some other autonomous and complementary principle, borrowed from the general doctrines of State succession, may be invoked to upset 62 . Lighthouse Arbitration case, supra, note 41, 108 : "The critical date evidently serves as the termination of Turkish responsibility and the commencement of Greek responsibility in the sense that everything which happened before the critical date and which can have given rise to charges against the concessionary firm continues to involve the responsibility of the Turkish State." the juridical effects of the said sharing of responsibilities according to the Protocol. 63 25. Some in doctrine have interpreted the reasoning of the Tribunal as an expression of a principle according to which the successor State should not take over the obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts committed by the predecessor State. 64 In fact, the Arbitral Tribunal's obiter dictum supports another rule : in cases of cession of territory, the continuing State should remain responsible for its own internationally wrongful acts committed before the date of succession. ° 26. In Claim No. 11, France was seeking compensation against Greece (as the successor State) relating to expenditures incurred by the French owner of the concession in the course of the construction of two new lighthouses from 1903 to 1908. 66 The Arbitral Tribunal found that the responsibility for the damage suffered by the French concessionaire was divided between the French company itself and both the Cretan authorities and the Ottoman Empire. It decided that Greece should not be held accountable for the commission of these internationally wrongful acts. The reasoning of the Arbitral Tribunal is as follows :
[T]he Tribunal sees no real reason to saddle, after the event, Greece, who had absolutely nothing to do with the dealings between those parties, with this responsibility, in whole or in part. Not even the part of the general responsibility for the events of 1903 to 1908 to be imputed to the autonomous State of Crete can be regarded as having devolved upon Greece. Such a transmission of responsibility is not justified in the present case either from the particular point of view of the final succession of Greece to the rights and obligations of 63 29. For instance, this is the situation which prevailed in the context of the break-up of the Austria-Hungary Dual Monarchy after World War I. Some consider this disintegration as an example of the dissolution of a State with the emergence of five new States (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Hungary). 70 The prevailing view, however, has been to consider it as a case of a series of secessions by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (which all became new States); and both Austria and Hungary being considered as the continuing States of the Monarchy. This is indeed the position that was adopted by the "Allied and Associated Powers" after the War. 71 The Allied insisted on both States being considered as continuing States precisely to ensure that they would be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts committed by the Dual Monarchy during the War. 72 On the contrary, Austria took the position that it was a new State in 1918 precisely with the view to avoid assuming any obligations arising out of the War. 76 It also concluded that the other new States (i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) which had seceded from the Monarchy should bear no responsibility for such damage : "All of the Successor States other than Austria and Hungary are classed as Allied or Associated Powers' and under the Treaties it is entirely clear that none of them is held liable for any damage suffered by American nationals resulting from acts of the Austro-Hungarian Government or its agents during either the period of American neutrality or American belligerency." 77 31. In the context of the break-up of the Austria-Hungary Dual Monarchy, many other municipal courts have adopted the principle that the continuing State remains responsible for any international wrongful acts committed before changes affecting its territory. This is, for instance, the position taken by both Polish courts 78 and German courts 79 in the context of the secession of Poland (1918) from the Monarchy. 32. The review of State practice also overwhelmingly supports the principle that whenever a State continues to exist after the secession of part of its territory it should remain responsible for the commission of its own internationally wrongful acts. 80 33. One example is the break-up of the U.S.S.R., where the former Republics of the U.S.S.R. (with the exception of the three Baltic States and Georgia) agreed that Russia would be considered as the "continuator" of the international legal personality of the U.S.S.R. in international organisations and in particular, at the United Nations Security Council. 81 Other States in the international community largely accepted this decision. 82 The affirmation that Russia is the "continuator"
State of the U.S.S.R. is clearly based on a legal fiction. 83 Thus, the U.S.S.R. did in fact cease to exist as a result of both the Declaration of Alma Ata and the Minsk Agreement. 84 Logically, Russia could not continue the existence of a State which had ceased to exist : there is no "resurrection" of States in international law. 85 From a logical point of view, the break-up of the U.S.S.R. should be regarded as a case of State dissolution and Russia as a new State. 86 However "illogical" it may seem, the fact of the matter is that all States concerned have recognised Russia's claim to be the continuing State of the U.S.S.R. This is ultimately the solution that prevailed as Russia took over U.S.S.R.'s seat at the UN Security Council. The next paragraphs briefly examine two relevant examples of State practice in the context of the break-up of the U.S.S.R. 34. During the Second World War, German troops seized numerous works of art in each of the occupied territories and brought them to Germany. The pillage, as well as the destruction, was particularly important in the territory of the U.S.S.R. The victory of the Red Army in 1945 was also followed by the pillage of works of art and cultural property in Germany. It is thus estimated that more than 2.5 million works of art were transferred from Germany to the Soviet Union at the time. 87 Some of these works of art were returned to the German Democratic Republic in the 1950s and 1960s. Up until recently, the content and the location of these treasures remained largely unknown. Before the break-up of the U.S.S.R., two treaties were entered into on 9 November 1990 between the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany. 88 The substance of Article 16 of the 1990 German-Soviet Union Good-Neighbourliness Treaty 89 was later reaffirmed in a Cultural Agreement entered into in 1992 (i.e. after the break-up of the Soviet Union) between Germany and Russia, where the parties committed to the restitution of cultural property which was "lost" or "unlawfully brought into the territory" of Russia. 90 This provision thus contains the commitment by Russia (as the continuing State of the U.S.S.R.) to provide reparation to Germany (in the form of the restitution of German cultural property) as a result of internationally wrongful acts committed by the Soviet Union (i.e. the cultural property "unlawfully brought"
87. An official 1958 statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union makes reference to some "2,614,874 objects of art and culture located in the U.S.S.R." During the 1994 negotiations between Russia and Germany, the latter listed some two hundred thousand works of art, two million books as well as three kilometres of archives to be restituted to museums, libraries, archives and collections in Germany (see para. 4 of the Bonn Protocol of 30 June 1994).
88. into its territory).
91 It should be noted that negotiations between the two States to secure the restitution of cultural property have so far remained unfruitful. 95 Case law and State practice in both contexts of cession of territories and secession show that the continuing State remains responsible for any international wrongful acts committed before changes affecting its territory. As a result, under international law, the Turkish Republic is responsible for any internationally wrongful acts, including acts of genocide, that took place before 1923. This is the position adopted by a number of writers. 96 Oktem reached the same conclusion in his recent study :
The legal continuity thesis [...] operates like a double-edged sword. The continuing State is ipso jure entitled to the predecessor's rights, but is also bound by the predecessor's obligations. The Ottoman legacy is a Pandora's box that may unveil all kinds of surprises. [...] As for an eventual delictual responsibility, not only the continuing State, but also the successor States may be held responsible for the acts of the predecessor State on the basis of customary law. The analysis of State practice indicates that the continuing State "remains responsible for the commission of its own internationally wrongful acts before the date of succession." 97 37. In my book, one issue raised was whether the principle of continuous responsibility for the continuing State should apply uniformly in all cases. In other words, I examined whether there were any circumstances where the successor State (i.e. the new secessionist State or the already-existing State to which territory was ceded) should be held accountable for internationally wrongful acts committed before the date of succession. The position adopted in my book is that there are, indeed, some situations where this should be the case. 98 One such circumstance would be whenever the secessionist State would have unjustly enriched itself as a result of such acts. 99 Another circumstance is when the internationally wrongful act is committed (before the date of succession) by an autonomous political entity with which the successor State has a structural continuity. 100 Another possibility is when an insurrectional movement commits an internationally wrongful act during its struggle to establish a new State.
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These exceptions simply do not apply to the situation of the Armenian genocide. These crimes were clearly not committed by any autonomous entity of a province within the Empire. Similarly, no insurrectional movement fighting for independence from the Empire committed any of these crimes.
38. Another relevant question concerns the actual location where the internationally wrongful acts were committed. The vast majority of these acts took place in the territory of what is now modern Turkey. It is true that some massacres were committed in territories that were later ceded to France after World War I. For instance, large-scale massacres took place in the region of Der ez-Zor, in today's Syria. Does that mean that the successor State (at the time France, and now Syria) should consequently be responsible for these acts simply because they took place on what is now its territory? 102 Our analysis of State practice shows that there is no principle under positive international law whereby the successor State is responsible for obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts committed by the predecessor State before the date of succession solely based on the fact that such acts took place on what is now its territory 103 It is submitted that there is especially no legal basis for any such transfer of responsibility in the present context. Thus, neither France (the successor State) nor the Arab populations had anything to do with any of the crimes committed by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian population. It would be clearly unjust to hold the new State of Syria accountable for crimes solely based on the ground that these acts were committed on what is now its territory. This is a fortiori the case considering that this territory was under Ottoman rule when the crimes were committed. 39. For all these reasons, Turkey is responsible for any internationally wrongful acts committed by the Ottoman Empire before its disintegration. This conclusion applies to all wrongful acts, including acts of genocide. Thus, there is no specific regime that applies to these acts. Under the rules of State succession of international law, the situation of the consequences of violations of jus cogens norms should not be treated differently from other "ordinary" norms of international law when it comes to continuity of responsibility. 104 
CONCLUSION
40. The basic question put forth at the outset of this chapter was as follows : can the modern State of Turkey, which was officially "created" in 1923, be held responsible under international law for internationally wrongful acts (including genocide) which were committed by the Ottoman Empire before its disintegration? Our conclusion is that Turkey should be considered under international law as the "continuing" State of the Ottoman Empire. The fact that Turkey is, in legal terms, "identical" to the Ottoman Empire has some important consequences in terms of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. Case law and State practice in the context of secession and cession of territory are clear : the continuing State remains responsible for its own internationally wrongful acts committed before the date of succession. Turkey should be held responsible for all internationally wrongful acts committed by the Ottoman Empire (including acts of genocide), which were committed before, during, and after World War I. 41. This being said, many different hurdles must be addressed before Turkey is actually held responsible for any acts committed by the Ottoman Empire. 105 Thus, which international court would have jurisdiction over such claim? The other possibility to submit a claim before a municipal court against Turkey seems remote considering State's jurisdictional immunity. Also in a post-War agreement between Turkey and the United States, the latter waived its rights (as well as that of its nationals) to claim any reparation against Turkey for acts that took place during the War. 106 Similarly, under Article 58 of the Lausanne Treaty, the Contracting Powers have renounced to "all pecuniary claims for the loss 105. E. OKTEM, supra, note 27, 581, acknowledging that his conclusion of continuity between the Ottoman Empire and Turkey "may have a bearing on the debate on the legal consequences of 1915 events concerning Ottoman Armenians," but adding that "it should not be expected that such a determination would necessarily bring about actual practical consequences. 
